

REMARKS

Applicants thank the Examiner for participating in the interview on August 17, 2007. Issues raised by the Examiner in the present office action, and claims they relate to, were discussed. With regard to dependent claims 10, 13, 23 and 26 a particular amendment was discussed. With regard to the rejections under section 112, first paragraph (lack of written description); section 112, second paragraph (indefiniteness); and under section 103, Applicants stated why they believe the Examiner's positions are not supported by the law or the facts, and the two references were discussed in this regard. Applicants also offered explanations of certain claim language by referring to examples in the disclosure. While no explicit agreement was reached as to the issues raised by the Examiner, it is Applicants' understanding that the dialogue during the interview was helpful towards reaching a resolution.

Applicants note that the Examiner's interview summary states: "The Examiner set forth the notion if 'concept' is an abstract then 'meanings' would be a subset of possible definitions of the concept" and that Applicants were "not sure whether the specification matched this notion." Applicants wish to clarify that the specification contains several examples that illustrate how meanings and concepts can be used, but that Applicants cannot determine whether the Examiner's notion quoted above is a correct, complete and useful characterization in every case.

Moreover, Applicants note that the Examiner's interview summary states: "'strength relationship' is simply a possible percent to a given concept and not a 'relationship' between meanings." Applicants respectfully disagree that the term "strength relationship" should be limited to just "a possible percent". On the contrary, Applicants emphasized in the interview that the description in paragraphs 0035 and 0036 of the specification is an example. However, Applicants believe that the Examiner's statement in this regard may be referring to the discussion regarding "strength relationship" during the interview where Applicants tried to clarify the syntax of the claim language for the Examiner and has now made clarifying amendments along these lines as well—i.e., by adding commas and the numbering (1) and (2).

In the office action dated July 12, 2007, all pending claims 1-31 were rejected. Applicants are amending dependent claims 10, 13, 23 and 26 to add punctuation marks and to eliminate the word "should". That is, the phrase in claim 13 now reads: "establishing a probability ... that the knowledge item be resolved to the one of the plurality of meanings". Favorable reconsideration is requested in view of the following remarks.

Rejections under section 112

Claims 1, 9-14, and 21-27 were rejected under § 112, first paragraph, as lacking written description. The Examiner stated that these claims contain the words "meanings" and/or "concepts" and that the specification fails to disclose the difference between these two words. The Examiner also stated that a synonym for "concept" is "meaning" in ROGET'S NEW MILLENIUM THESAURUS, (1st ed.). In the interview summary, it was stated that the Examiner is willing to withdraw the rejection with regard to "concepts".

Applicants appreciate the withdrawal of the rejection with regard to "concepts". With regard to "meanings", however, Applicants traverse the rejection. Applicants submit that the subject matter of the rejected claims has adequate written description in the present disclosure, including the "meanings" recited in the claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has articulated the written-description requirement as follows:

35 USC 112, first paragraph, requires a "written description of the invention" which is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement. The purpose of the "written description" requirement is broader than to merely explain how to "make and use"; the applicant must also convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention. The invention is, for purposes of the "written description" inquiry, whatever is now claimed.

Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Thus, Applicants submit that the issue is whether the present disclosure conveys that, at the time of filing,

Applicants were in possession of the inventions of the claims now rejected. Moreover, these inventions should be defined by what is now recited in the claims at issue.

First, it must be noted that “meanings” and “concepts”, the terms central to the Examiner’s rejection, were present in the claims as originally filed. For example, claim 1 mentioned “related meaning” and “knowledge item meaning” already when filed; likewise, dependent claim 8 mentioned “associated concepts” already when filed. Moreover, the specification as of the filing date is replete with mentions of meanings and concepts in the several examples that are described therein. *See, e.g.*, Spec. paragraphs 0023, 0028, 0029, 0032, 0035, 0036 and 0047-0049. As such, the record shows that Applicants were in possession of subject matter regarding “meanings” and “concepts” at the time of filing.

Second, the specification does describe meanings and concepts such that differences between them can be understood. *See, e.g.*, the following statements:

Meaning can be a representation of context and can be, for example, a vector of weighted concepts or groups or clusters of words. Spec. paragraph 0020.

In one embodiment, determining the knowledge item meaning comprises determining which of the associated concepts represents the knowledge item meaning. Spec. paragraph 0028.

The above quotes are taken among a plentitude of other disclosure relating to the terms meaning and concept in the specification and illustrate that the two terms are related to each other. Therefore, the interpretation of meaning strictly as a synonym for concept does not seem to be consistent with how the terms are used in the specification or the claims. As such, the Examiner’s interpretation may be incorrect.

Moreover, it seems that the Examiner may have misread the resource that was cited in support of the rejection (ROGET’S NEW MILLENNIUM THESAURUS, (1st ed.)). The 2007 edition of this thesaurus appears to be available online and lists the following terms as synonyms of concept:

abstraction, apprehension, approach, big idea*, brain wave*, brainchild*,
conceit, conception, conceptualization, consideration, hypothesis, image,
impression, intellection, notion, perception, slant, supposition, theory,
thought, twist, view, wienie, wrinkle

ROGET'S NEW MILLENNIUM THESAURUS, First Edition (v 1.3.1), *available at*
<http://thesaurus.reference.com/browse/concept>. The list does not include "meaning" as a
synonym for concept. Thus, the cited ROGET'S thesaurus does not appear to support the
Examiner's contention.

In any event, Applicants are not choosing any particular dictionary or thesaurus
definition as a restriction on the interpretation of any claim term. Rather, Applicants submit
that there is ample written description in the present disclosure showing that Applicants had
possession of the subject matter regarding meanings and concepts at the time of filing. As such,
Applicants request that this rejection for lack of written description be removed.

Dependent claims 10, 13, 23 and 26 were rejected under § 112, first paragraph, for lack
of written description regarding the terms "strength relationship" and "probability". The
Examiner stated that the claims "state the use of two formulas which generate the 'strength' and
'probability' but the specification is silent on the composition of these formulas."

This rejection is traversed. Applicants submit that there are ample indications in the
record that they had possession of this subject matter at filing.

First, it must be noted that the terms at issue here, like the ones in the rejection
addressed above, were present in the claims as originally filed. As such, the record shows that
Applicants were in possession of subject matter regarding "strength relationship" and
"probability" at the time of filing.

Second, the claims at issue do not "state the use of two formulas ..." as the Examiner
contends. Rather, claim 10 now recites, in relevant parts, "establishing a probability, for each
of the plurality of meanings, that the knowledge item be resolved to the one of the plurality of
meanings" and "determining a strength of relationship between (1) each of the plurality of
meanings and (2) the at least one meaning of the identified information". There is no mention
of a formula in the claim.

Moreover, the specification describes that probability establishment can be performed in block 300 of subroutine 212 (spec. paragraph 0046) and that strength determination can be performed in block 302 of the same subroutine (spec. paragraph 0047). Adjustment of probability using a determined strength (as also recited in the claim) can be performed in block 304 of the subroutine.

Applicants submit that there is ample written description in the present disclosure showing that Applicants had possession of the subject matter regarding probability establishment and strength determination at the time of filing. As such, Applicants request that this rejection for lack of written description be removed.

Dependent claims 10, 13, 23 and 26 were also rejected under § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite due to the term “should be resolved”. The Examiner stated that this is “a relative term”.

Applicants respectfully disagree with the Examiner's contentions regarding this claim term, and pointed out during the interview that the term “should be resolved” relates to the term “probability” earlier in the claim. Nevertheless, to advance prosecution forward and without conceding that the rejection has merit, Applicants have eliminated the term “should” from the claims at issue. Accordingly, Applicants request that the rejection be removed on this basis.

Rejections under section 103

Claims 1-7, 14-20 and 27-31 were rejected under § 103(a) as unpatentable over the “Web advertising” reference (McCandless) in view of the IndustryNet reference (Jones). Dependent claims 8-13 and 21-26 were rejected under § 103(a) as unpatentable over McCandless in view of Jones and U.S. 5,867,799 (Lang).

These rejections are traversed. Applicants submit that the subject matter of the rejected claims is patentable over the references of record.

Applicants' claim 1 is directed to a method for interpreting a knowledge item. A knowledge item is received, and information to be used in interpreting the knowledge item is identified. The information is identified as having a predefined relationship with the knowledge

item. The claim recites determining at least one meaning of the identified information, and determining a plurality of meanings of the knowledge item. At least one of the plurality of meanings is selected using the at least one meaning of the identified information. The selected at least one of the plurality of meanings is recorded as an interpretation of the knowledge item. None of the references of record disclose determinations of meaning, selection of a meaning, or recording of a selected meaning as recited in the claim.

McCandless is a two-page article containing a high-level description of web advertising, mainly directed to the business aspects thereof, such as how web advertising differs from traditional advertising and what advertising models are used on the web. The Examiner noted that McCandless mentions “keywords used in a search”, and thereafter appears to have misunderstood some other portions of McCandless. In reality, McCandless is not directed toward interpreting a knowledge item, and several steps of the present claim 1 are neither disclosed nor suggested by McCandless.

First, the Examiner cited to page 8, column 2, lines 3-10 of McCandless as disclosing identification of information to be used in interpreting a knowledge item, because that portion states “knowledge about an individual”. Applicants respectfully disagree. The Examiner’s interpretation of “identif[ied] information” in this portion of the claim appears to be inconsistent with how the Examiner interprets the term “identified information” that appears later in the claim (see below). As such, Applicants submit that McCandless does not disclose or suggest identification of information to be used in interpretation as recited in the claim.

Second, the Examiner cited to page 8, column 2, lines 11-14 of McCandless as disclosing a determination of at least one meaning of the identified information. Applicants respectfully disagree. The cited portion describes that advertisers receive feedback on advertisement effectiveness by the extent to which users click on the ad. The fact that an ad that receives many clicks is considered effective has nothing to do with determining a meaning of identified information. The clicks do not inform the advertiser what is the meaning of knowledge the advertiser has about an individual. There is no mention of determining a meaning of any information in this portion of McCandless, let alone of information that has

been identified as having a predetermined relationship with a knowledge item, as required by the present claim.

Moreover, the Examiner stated that “‘Identified information’ of applicant is equivalent to the search results of the query.” This is directly contrary to the Examiner’s interpretation above which stated that knowledge about an individual corresponds to the identified information. Also, the cited passage of McCandless does not mention any results of a search.

The Examiner conceded that McCandless does not teach determining a plurality of meanings of a knowledge item, selecting one of them, and recording the selection, as recited in the present claims. Applicants agree, with the addition that McCandless also fails to disclose or suggest other steps of the claims as discussed above.

The Examiner cited to Jones as providing the admittedly missing subject matter. However, Jones is also not directed toward interpreting a knowledge item, and several steps of the present claim 1 are neither disclosed nor suggested by Jones even when combined with McCandless.

The Examiner stated that “find relevant articles by keyword” of Jones page 54, column 3, lines 6-55 discloses a determination of a plurality of meanings of a knowledge item. Applicants respectfully disagree. The cited passage appears to describe searching by keyword, not determining the meaning of something, such as a knowledge item. In any event, the description fails to disclose determining a plurality of meanings of a knowledge item.

The Examiner stated that “user model” of Jones page 58, column 3, lines 26-55 discloses selecting at least one of the plurality of meanings. The Examiner stated that “the agent asks the user if the information in the article was interesting” is equivalent to “meaning of the identified information”.

Applicants respectfully disagree. Jones mentions that a user model is built to represent the interests of a user based on information gathered by an agent. The model does not relate to a plurality of meanings of anything, let alone a knowledge item. The agent asks the user whether the article was interesting to gather information for building the user mode. The asking is not done to determine the meaning of a knowledge item.

The Examiner stated that “the system stores every piece of information that the user chooses to read or ignore as a case” of Jones page 58, column 3, lines 26-55 discloses recording the selected meaning. Applicants respectfully disagree. The storing of pieces of user information in Jones is done to gather information for building the user mode. The storing is not done to record the meaning of a knowledge item.

As discussed above, even the combined disclosure of McCandless and Jones fails to disclose or suggest several steps of the present claim 1. Claim 1 and its dependent claims 2-13 are therefore patentable over McCandless and Jones. Independent claims 14 and 27 include similar or corresponding language. These claims and their dependent claims are therefore also patentable over the references.

Lang was cited as disclosing “processing ... to determine any known concepts”. Applicants are not conceding that this characterization of Lang is correct, but submit that Lang nevertheless fails to teach or suggest the subject matter missing from McCandless and Jones. As such, the present claims are also patentable over Lang.

Conclusion

Claims 1-31 are patentable over the references of record and appear to be in condition for allowance.

It is believed that all of the pending claims have been addressed. However, the absence of a reply to a specific rejection, issue or comment does not signify agreement with or concession of that rejection, issue or comment. In addition, because the arguments made above may not be exhaustive, there may be reasons for patentability of any or all pending claims (or other claims) that have not been expressed. Finally, nothing in this paper should be construed as an intent to concede any issue with regard to any claim, except as specifically stated in this paper, and the amendment of any claim does not necessarily signify concession of unpatentability of the claim prior to its amendment.

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Respectfully submitted,



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